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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks are becoming federated
and mobile environments. These new capabilities pose a lot of new
possibilities and challenges. One of these challenges is to create a
secure environment to allow multiple trusted companies to share
and merge their sensor network infrastructure. The most basic
need for a secure environment is the deployment of key material.
However, most current day research assumes pre-shared secrets
between the sensor nodes of most, if not all, companies in a
federation. These solutions are often not scalable nor mobile
enough to meet realistic business requirements. Additionally,
most key deployment protocols totally omit any connectivity with
back-end infrastructure. This paper proposes a novel deployment
protocol for the MAnagement of Secret keYs (MASY). MASY
allows secure deployment of a key to a sensor node when it enters
a previously unknown network. By off-loading the trust creation
process to the resource-rich back-end infrastructure, the burden
on the sensor nodes remains very limited.
Index Terms—Security, Key Distribution, Wireless Sensor
Network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can be used for a very
wide variety of applications. A classic example is environmen-
tal monitoring [1], where a single party monitors a certain
location with statically located sensor nodes. However, the
field of WSNs is moving away from those mono-application,
single party, statically located use cases which have been
dominating the research of the last few years. New use cases
such as container tracking [2] and personal health monitoring
[3] create a much more dynamic environment. WSNs will
be used for many, concurrent, and evolving applications,
cooperating with many nodes from several different companies
which work together as a federation and, most importantly,
sensor nodes will be highly mobile [4]. These new assumptions
pose a number of new challenges: how to manage the evolving
applications on these resource constrained nodes, how to cope
with the high mobility of the nodes and how to secure all
the necessary relationships between the multiple and evolving
companies and nodes that are present in a single WSN.
So, in many real world applications, WSNs consist out of
many nodes from many different and changing companies
(see figure 1). Additionally, the gateway connecting the nodes
with the Internet is managed by another company, the local
authority. All these nodes need to be able to offer and consume
each others services securely. The most basic of such services
is the ability to securely route all the messages over the
network. How to set up the trust and key material required
for the security in such a mobile and federated environment
remains a significant challenge.
Current security research in WSN often makes the assump-
tion that the necessary key material is either partly or entirely
present on the sensor nodes at deployment time. In a mobile
environment this assumption is not scalable. Additionally, any
connectivity with the Internet or back-end infrastructure is
omitted in this research. On the other hand, security research
in the mobile and embedded area of Vehicle Area Networks
(VANETs) focuses mostly on the use and deployment of
asymmetric certificates, which is too heavy weight for most
of the current generation of sensor nodes.
In this paper, we propose a protocol for the MAnagement
of Secret keYs (MASY), which allows a node to build a trust
relationship in the form of a shared symmetrical key with the
local authority without pre-agreeing secrets. It requires that
the company that hosts the gateway and the company that
owns the sensor node trust each-other. However, MASY does
not require to exchange any secrets before the node actually
enters the network. Additionally, it only requires that the nodes
support symmetric encryption.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the
context of this paper and lists the main requirements of the
key deployment protocol. Section III gives an overview of the
current related work in WSN and VANET security. Section IV
lists the main assumptions our protocol makes and proposes
the MASY protocol. Section V provides a security analysis
and implementation overview. Section VI lists some interesting
options for extending the protocol and summarizes the main
contributions of this paper.
II. CONTEXT AND REQUIREMENTS
A. Use Case
In this paper, we apply the use case of container tracking to
illustrate the need to identify multiple companies and to share
services. Containers travel around the world, visiting many
ports and warehouses along their journey. Many companies
are interested in data related to the containers. The company
that owns the containers wants a continuous report on the
status of their containers. Because of this need, the company
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Fig. 1. Example of a Federated Wireless Sensor Network.
installs one or more sensor nodes to continuously monitor the
temperature and humidity in its containers. Local authorities
also want data from the containers for customs declarations.
Other companies need to be able to communicate with the
sensors in the containers to route their messages to the gateway
or potentially use services of the sensor nodes.
The company that owns the containers wants to receive the
monitoring feed from the sensors in the container. In order to
allow this feed, the sensor nodes need to securely communicate
with the back-end servers of the company. Of course the sensor
nodes are able to encrypt the message to the back-end server.
However, in order to securely communicate, the messages have
to be securely routed to the gateway. If the routing in the
network does not happen in a secure way, any malicious party
can intercept all message and prevent the nodes from sending
any information.
In a port or warehouse, the local authority (the company
that owns the warehouse) also wants to monitor the assets
that are present. One option is that the local authority deploys
a sensor network of its own. This, however, would be costly,
redundant and cannot measure the internal state of containers.
An alternative is that the container owners allow the local
authority to use some of the data of their sensors so the local
authority can have a real-time and accurate view of all goods
that are currently in its care.
The companies owning other containers in the vicinity of the
original container also want information and services of their
sensors. The most important service is the delivery of mes-
sages to the gateway using other nodes, so that the messages
can be delivered to their own back-end servers. Additional
services might be offered for other applications. For example
a company could use sensor data to ensure fault tolerance of
sensors in case of sensor node failure. Some sensors can also
provide more accurate or different types of data than others.
For example, the ambient temperature of containers holding
chemical, perishable or pharmaceutical goods must be closely
monitored. In order to limit the redundancy and cost for the
companies, a federation can be formed and the data gathered
from the sensors shared.
B. Sensor Network Challenges
In order to fulfill this scenario, four key requirements must
be met: (1) nodes must be able to set up secure communica-
tions when they enter a previously unknown network, (2) the
solution must be scalable, (3) code overhead must be limited
and (4) communication overhead must be limited.
The first requirement relates to mobility. As containers and
their nodes travel across the world, they cannot know the keys
to all locations in advance. Since the nodes do not share any
key material with the local network when they arrive, this key
material must be deployed in an ad-hoc fashion. The sensor
nodes however must know that the local key they receive is
from a trusted source. If not, it might open the sensor nodes up
to possible exploitation. On the other side, the local authority
must be sure that it does not share the local key with an
untrusted party, since this would lead to a breach of network
security.
The second requirement is scalability. WSNs in ports and
warehouses consist of hundreds if not thousands of nodes.
Many nodes can enter or leave the network in a very limited
time frame, for example when a container ship arrives in the
port. This means the solution must be able to handle many
nodes entering and leaving the network at any one time.
The third requirement is limited code overhead. Wireless
sensor nodes in a commercial environment need to be very
cheap. Memory and processing capabilities are very limited
in these nodes, so applications need to be as small and light
weight as possible.
The fourth requirement is limited communication overhead.
Wireless sensor nodes are severely energy constrained. The
amount of communication they can perform is limited. Once
they reach that limit, they seize to operate until recharged.
However, since containers are often far away from their
owner, one cannot easily recharge the sensor nodes. So any
communication overhead must be reduced to a minimum.
C. Attacker Model
In this paper we assume active external attackers that wish
to remain undetected. This means that the attackers have the
following capabilities:
 The attackers can monitor the entire network. However
we assume that they cannot break any encrypted commu-
nication.
 The attackers can inject new messages into the network.
 The attackers can subvert nodes, revealing all their key
material.
We do not consider denial of service or flooding attacks as
they would clearly signal the presence of an attacker.
D. Security Requirements
A key deployment protocol has to meet several security
requirements. We identify four security requirements: (1)
confidentiality, (2) authentication, (3) survivability, and (4)
availability.
The first security requirement is confidentiality. The key
material has to remain confidential and can only be shared
with trusted parties. When key confidentiality is breached, any
attacker can gain access to the network and potentially start to
exploit other sensor nodes. Given the mobile and ubiquitous
nature of sensor nodes, it is very likely an attacker can obtain
one or more sensor nodes and learn the confidential material
through probing of memory. This means that other measures
have to be available to recover from key disclosure.
The second security requirement is authentication. Nodes
can only enter a network when a trust relation can be created
between the sensor node and the gateway with guaranteed
authenticity of both parties. So they have to authenticate each
other. The company that hosts the network must authenticate
the companies that want to enter the network so no malicious
parties can join the network. On the other side the company
that enters the network must ensure that the company that
hosts the network can be trusted so it doesn’t open up its
sensor nodes to potential abuse.
The third security requirement is survivability. Survivability
means that when one node or company is compromised, the
remainder of the network can still recover from the breach or
continue to operate without too much interference. In Wireless
Sensor Networks, the nodes are fairly fragile and vulnerable.
Malicious parties can fairly easily get access to these nodes
since usually they are not in a secure location. Those malicious
parties can then probe or corrupt those nodes so they gain
access to the key material inside those nodes or make the nodes
perform malicious operations. A key deployment protocol
must be able to withstand or recover from node capture.
The fourth security requirement is availability. Since no new
nodes can enter a network without having keys deployed to
them, it is vital that the key deployment service is maximally
available.
III. RELATED WORK
This section evaluates related work. First the related work
in WSN security research is discussed, then we look at the
field of Vehicle Area Networks (VANETs), because VANETS
have to deal with an inherent high mobility and connectivity
for which several solutions have already been proposed.
WSN key deployment protocols can roughly be divided in
two types: (1) symmetric key deployment protocols and (2)
asymmetric key deployment protocols.
A. Symmetric Key Protocols
Symmetric key deployment protocols currently are the pre-
ferred protocols in WSNs. They have the advantage of being
light weight in both communication overhead and code and
execution overhead. Hence, it is currently considered more
suitable for WSNs. Camtepe et al. [5] provide a survey of
current key distribution protocols. At this time, there are two
general categories of symmetric key protocols: (1) protocols
with a pre-shared keys with the gateway and (2) protocols with
a pre-distributed key ring.
The first category of symmetric key protocol are the pro-
tocols where every node shares a symmetric key with the
gateway. The gateway acts as the Key Distribution Center in
this scheme and can securely deploy a group key to each of the
nodes. If two or more nodes want to securely communicate,
they ask the gateway to generate a secret key for them and
deploy it to these nodes. Examples of such a system are LEAP
[6] and PAKA [7].
It is clear that this system is fairly scalable, secure and light
weight. However, this system is not mobile. It is assumed that
every node has a key pre-shared with the gateway. Since we
assume that our nodes travel between multiple WSNs and are
connected with multiple gateways, we cannot assume that they
always share a key with the gateway.
The second category is the network-only category of key
deployment. There is no central trust entity that is able to
deploy new keys or key material. Every node has a pre-
deployed key ring or some pre-deployed key material [8]
which is used to generate new keys. When two or more sensor
nodes want to communicate with each other, they compare the
key material on their key ring and use the shared key material
to generate a shared secret. If no keys are shared, a third party
is searched with whom they both share key material. This
trusted third party can then securely deploy a key to the first
two nodes.
This is a very broad category with two sub categories, the
probabilistic and the deterministic protocols. The probabilistic
protocols have no guarantee that they have shared key material
with a node nearby. There is a chance that a key is shared
depending on the network size and the key ring size. These
protocols have to search for a third party when no key is
shared. The deterministic protocols guarantee that each node
can securely create a key with each other node. However, in
order to guarantee this, the network size must be fairly limited
in order for each node to have unique key material. It is clear
that these are light weight protocols. However, this system is
not very scalable. To reliably share a key with each node in
each container, the key ring would have to be quite large. If
the node only shares a key ring with other local nodes, this
system would not be mobile, since new nodes would have no
way of securely receiving the key ring.
B. Asymmetric Key Protocols
The second type of key deployment protocols are the
asymmetric key deployment protocols. It was assumed that
asymmetric keys require too much communication overhead
and processing cost to use in WSNs. Recently though, Elliptic
Curve Cryptography has lowered the code and communication
overhead required for asymmetric cryptography [9], making it
a viable alternative for WSNs. Additionally, through the use
of specialized encryption chips, the energy cost of encryption
can be significantly lowered [10]. However it does still pose
some challenges.
To achieve mobility and to securely agree keys, the sensor
nodes have to verify the gateway’s certificate and the gateway
must be able to verify the sensor nodes’ certificates. Assuming
many different Certification Authorities certify the gateways,
the overhead on the sensor node would still be quite signifi-
cant. These certificates also have to be kept consistent with
Certificate Revocation Lists. These additional requirements
to secure the key agreement protocol cause a significant
communication overhead, which should be avoided on WSNs.
So while this solution might offer an advantage in mobility
and scalability, the code and communications overhead are
still significant. Furthermore currently most research on using
asymmetric keys in WSNs is focused on evaluating and
optimizing the implementations and usage of these protocols,
while almost no research is done on the key deployment and
key management of asymmetric keys in WSNs.
All of the related work mentioned here totally omits the fact
that almost all sensor networks are connected to the Internet
and have some form of back-end infrastructure available. This
infrastructure can perform the resource intensive operations
such as certificate validation and key agreement.
C. VANET Key Protocols
VANETs are ad-hoc networks of vehicles and roadside
infrastructure. This unique field of wireless networks poses a
great deal of challenges. The high mobility is of course one of
the major challenges. Since in the future many critical applica-
tions will require Vehicle To Vehicle (V2V) communication,
it is important that the communication between vehicles is
secured. Securing these vehicle networks has recently caught
the attention of several researchers. New and innovative key
management schemes have been proposed to meet these chal-
lenges.
A common concept in VANET security is that each vehicle
has two certificates: a permanent, global certificate and a
temporary, local certificate. An example of such a protocol is
the TACK protocol suggested by Struder et al. [11]. The global
Certification Authority is the vehicle registration authority of
the country where the vehicle is registered. This CA certifies
an asymmetric key pair to each vehicle it registers. However,
this certificate cannot be used in a local setting due to privacy
constraints. So, in order to be able to securely communicate
with other local cars, the local authority provides a service that
provides each vehicle on their territory with a local certificate.
When a vehicle enters a new local network, it requests a
local certificate. The vehicle provides his global certificate,
which is validated by the local authority. The local authority
also provides his certificate which is validated by the vehicle.
When mutual trust is established, the local authority can
deploy a new temporary local certificate. This certificate can
then be used by the vehicle to set up secure communications
with all vehicles in the territory of the local authority.
It is clear that this is a solution which meets the mobil-
ity requirement. Keys are deployed securely and in an ad-
hoc fashion. However, it requires a lot of asymmetric key
management and communication between the vehicles, the
local and the global Certification Authority. The required
communication and processing overhead makes this protocol
unsuited for use in Wireless Sensor Networks.
To conclude, current security research in WSNs lacks mo-
bility, while current mobile security (VANET) research is too
resource-intensive to be used in Wireless Sensor Networks.
Additionally, the pervasive presence of the Internet remains
unused in current WSN security research.
IV. MASY KEY DEPLOYMENT PROTOCOL
A. Assumptions
MASY makes the following assumptions: (1) nodes can
only perform symmetric cryptography operations, (2) each
node shares a symmetric key with the back-end of its company,
(3) when a node enters a network it does not share any key
material with the local network, and (4) a trust relationship
exists between the owning company and the local authority
that manages the gateway.
The first assumption is that nodes can only perform sym-
metric encryption. Recent research has shown that nodes
are capable of performing asymmetric cryptography, however
there still is a significant energy cost and communication
overhead. That is why the protocol does not use asymmetric
cryptography on the sensor nodes themselves.
The second assumption is that each node shares a symmetric
key with the company. A trust relationship in the form of a
secret key is needed in order to securely communicate with
each other. Since all sensor nodes undoubtedly start their
journey at the location of the company, it is reasonable to
assume that the company can securely deploy a secret key
onto the sensor nodes.
The third assumption states that a node does not share a
key with the local network when it enters the network. When
a node enters a network, MASY assumes it does not know
anything about that network, so it cannot share a key with it.
The alternative is that all the necessary keys are pre-loaded
on the sensor node. Since we assume that sensor nodes travel
between many networks, this would mean that it needs a
significant amount of keys pre-loaded on the sensor node,
which requires a significant amount of memory. If any key
is compromised, an attacker can potentially abuse the sensor
node. If the group keys are present on the gateway, the gateway
cannot revoke its key since it is already present on the sensor
nodes. If the company wants to revoke or change the key, it
needs to be possible to remotely manage the key store of the
sensor nodes while they are in the field, which is what we are
attempting to achieve in this paper. Additionally, when nodes
cannot receive new keys in the field, all the networks need to
be known and reserved in advance.
The fourth and last assumption is that the company of
the sensor node and the local authority who manages the
network are in a mutual federation, so a trust relationship
exists between them. If there is no trust between these two
companies, a node should not be able to enter the network.
Term Explanation
N Nonce
CompIP IP address of company back-end
M MAC Address of the new node
GW Gateway
BE Back-end
NN New node that enters the network
RN Relay node
GK Group key of the local network
CK Company key
SK Session key between GW and BE
TABLE I
LEGEND OF ABBREVIATIONS
Communication Content Size(bytes)
NN ! RN hello: M,CompIP,N,fM,CompIP,NgCK 32
RN ! GW f hello gGK 32
GW ! BE f hello , GK gSK 48
BE ! GW f reply : M , fGKgCK gSK 24
GW ! RN f reply gGK 24
RN ! NN reply 24
TABLE II
PROTOCOL FOR DEPLOYING THE GROUP KEY ONTO A NEW NODE
The trust between these two parties can be verified by verifying
each others certificates. By using a certificate based approach
and a PKI, the gateway and company only need to trust a
number of Certificate Authorities (CAs). If the parties are
trusted by the CAs, then they can trust each other.
B. MASY Protocol
In this section we propose the MASY MAnagement of
Secret keYs protocol for when a new node enters a network.
The MASY protocol operates as follows (see fig 2 and tables
I and II).
Step 1: NN enters an unknown network: When a sensor
node detects it has entered a new network (for example
because it can overhear encrypted communication or a gateway
beacon), it sends out a hello message. This hello message
consists out of the identity of the sensor node (a MAC address
M), the IP address of the company back-end (CompIP), a
counter nonce and a signature of this message with the key
the node shared with the company. The identity of the sensor
node is needed because the local network has to be able to
somehow identify the sensor node and the back-end needs to
be able to determine which node has entered the network. The
gateway has to know the IP-address of the back-end in order to
set up communications with it. The counter nonce is needed
to guarantee freshness of the messages. This can also be a
time-stamp if the sensor nodes are time synchronized with the
back-end. The message has to be signed with the company
key so the company can verify it was indeed a trusted sensor
node that sent the hello message.
Step 2: RN node relays hello message: When a sensor
node in the network receives a hello message, it must forward
it toward the gateway. Each sensor node in the network knows
who the gateway is and what route it needs to take. If several
nodes receive the hello message, only one needs to send it.
Since the relay nodes are already in the network, this traffic
can be encrypted with the group key so only if an outsider is
in communication range of the new sensor node, it can hear
that a new sensor node wants to join.
Step 3: GW receives hello and relays it together with
GK to BE: When the gateway receives the hello message, it
parses it and determines who the back-end of the sensor node
is. The gateway can see who the back-end is based on the
IP-address of the gateway in the hello message.
Once the gateway knows the identity of the company, it
can contact the company. Once a connection is made, the two
parties can verify each other. This can be done by starting an
SSL connection with mutual authentication. Both the sender
and the receiver need to prove that they can be trusted by
providing a certificate that can be verified. Once the certificates
have been verified, a cipher suite and secret key (SK) are
agreed upon and a secure channel is set up.
Once a secure channel is established between the gateway
and the company back-end, the gateway can transmit the hello
message and the network group key (GK).
Step 4: Transmitting the reply: Once the company re-
ceives the hello message, it can verify that the hello message
originated from a node of the company by verifying the
signature. If the signature is valid, the back-end can be sure
that a sensor node is trying to connect with the gateway. When
it then receives the group key over the secured channel, it can
encrypt this group key with the company key and send it back
to the gateway with the identification of the node M.
Step 5: Returning the reply to the NN: The gateway can
then send the group key encrypted with the company key back
to the new sensor node. This can be done by transmitting the
reply to the sensor node that relayed the hello message. The
relay node can then directly transmit the reply to the sensor
node.
Step 6: NN receives GK: Once the sensor node receives
the reply, it can decrypt the group key with its own company
key. Once it has decrypted the group key, it can securely
communicate with the network and gateway.
The group key has been deployed to the sensor node, with-
out any prior trust between the sensor node and the gateway.
The group key was always transmitted in an encrypted format
so outsiders are not able to intercept it without compromising
either the company key or the SSL channel between the
gateway and the company back-end.
Once the group key is established the sensor node is a
part of the network. It can securely communicate with its
neighbours so it can set up secure routing tables and secure
communications with each node in the network.
An alternative is that instead of deploying a group key to
the sensor node, a unique key is deployed to the sensor node.
This key would only be shared between the sensor node and
the gateway. Once this key is deployed, the sensor node can
securely communicate with the gateway. To communicate with
other sensor nodes, the gateway can act as a Key Distribution
Center. The sensor node can ask the gateway to generate a key
1: hello:M,CompIP,N,{msg}SK
2: relay hello
3: {hello,GK}SSL
4: reply: M,{GK}SK
5: relay reply
6: reply
Gateway
Relaying nodeNode entering new 
network with MAC M
Back-end server 
@ CompIP
msg
Fig. 2. Overview of the key deployment protocol.
to communicate with other sensor nodes, and the gateway can
then deploy this key to the other nodes.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis
This section provides a security analysis of the MASY
protocol. We look at the confidentiality, authentication, sur-
vivability and availability of MASY.
1) Confidentiality: MASY makes sure that the group key
remains confidential at all times. MASY guarantees this since
the group key is transferred from the gateway to the back-
end server encrypted with an agreed upon session key over
a secure SSL connection. The key is then encrypted with the
company key that the company shares with the sensor node.
An attacker thus cannot overhear the network key and start
decrypting the traffic.
2) Gateway Authentication: A node might sometimes enter
a malicious network with a malicious gateway. In such a
case, it should not be able to initiate communications with
the network. When it enters the network, the sensor node will
still send out a hello message, since it has no way to decide
whether it is in a trustworthy or malicious network.
If we assume that the gateway wants to start communication
with the node, in order to potentially gain access to restricted
services, it will send the hello message to the node’s back-
end server in order to deploy a key to the node. However,
the gateway will fail to authenticate itself with the back-end
server. Thus the sensor node will not receive the group key
and will not enter into the network.
3) Company Authentication: An attacker might try to enter
the network by acting as a new company. When the attacker’s
node enters the network, it will send out a hello message.
This message will be sent to the gateway since the nodes in
the network have no way to decide whether or not to trust
such a node.
When the gateway receives the message it will try to connect
with the back-end of the company. The gateway will then fail
to authenticate the back-end server. Since the authentication
fails, the gateway will not hand over the group key to this
company, so the network key will remain secure.
4) Survivability: A WSN must survive the capture of one
or more sensor nodes. Since the sensor nodes are very often far
away from their owner, it is possible that an attacker captures
a sensor node and manages to extract all secret information
from this sensor node. This reveals all the keys that are present
on the sensor node to the attacker.
If the node is connected to a network, the current group
key is compromised. The first step to mitigate the attack
is to identify the malicious node. Several mechanics have
been proposed to identify malicious nodes when a node has
been compromised, going from network clustering to intrusion
detection systems and tamper evident hardware. However, we
consider this out of scope of this paper.
Once the offending node is identified, the gateway can
initiate a re-keying. Every sensor node which is still intact
can receive a new group key in a secure way by repeating the
protocol. The new group key is deployed using the company
key which is unique for the nodes of each company. The
compromised nodes will be excluded from the network.
5) Availability: The MASY protocol can fail if one of
several services is not available.
The first service that has to be available is that the node has
to be in range of a networked node or the gateway. It is clear
that in order to be part of any network, the node must be able
to send messages to the network. If this condition is not met,
the node cannot enter the network.
The second service is secure routing to the gateway. If
the node is part of an disconnected network without access
to a gateway or the Internet, the protocol can not operate.
However, if there is no Internet connectivity, the node cannot
authenticate the network or the nodes in the network, so it
should not be able to connect with the network.
The third service is the gateway. The gateway must be
available in order to process the hello message and securely
transmit the group key to the company. It could be that
a gateway goes off-line due to an attack or accident. This
threat can be mitigated by duplicating the gateway. The only
knowledge a gateway must posses is the group key and the
ability to authenticate foreign companies. By duplicating the
gateway, more requests can be processed at the same time and
the failure of one gateway would not interfere with the ability
of new nodes to enter the network.
The last service that has to be available is the back-end
service of the company. If this service is not available, the
gateway cannot securely hand over the key to the company,
nor can the company authenticate the gateway. Again this
threat can be mitigated by duplicating the back-end servers.
The server only has to know the company key that the node
holds and has to have the ability to authenticate the gateway.
Implementation ROM Overhead (kB) RAM Overhead (B)
Tmote Sky (Contiki) 5,7 300
Sunspot 10,0 7000
LEAP protocol 17,9 600
TABLE III
IMPLEMENTATION OVERHEAD FOR MASY
B. Implementation
In this section we evaluate an implementation of MASY
for 2 sensor platforms : the resource constrained Tmote Sky
platform and the resource rich SunSPOT platform. We look
at the application overhead and runtime memory for both
programs (see table III) . Finally we evaluate the message
size (see table II).
We have implemented the MASY protocol on the Tmote
Sky sensor node platform running the Contiki Operating
System. The Tmote Sky is a very limited sensor node with
1 mB storage, 48 kB flash memory and only 10 kB RAM. It
is a very limited platform which is likely not able to perform
asymmetric encryption. Contiki was selected as operating sys-
tem because of its limited requirements and modular design.
The node application has a total size of 28880 bytes.
This includes all the necessary Contiki packages and the
AES encryption package. The standard Contiki platform with
standard Rime communication support requires 23232 bytes.
We used a non-optimised open source implementation of
the AES algorithm which requires 4720 bytes. The protocol
itself only requires another 928 bytes. By comparison, the
LEAP protocol requires 17.9kB of ROM. The reason for the
difference is that LEAP performs key establishment and key
generation on the sensor node itself. It requires a much larger
code base to function compared to our protocol.
The runtime overhead remains very limited at ca. 300
bytes which is mostly used for communication and encryption
buffer. By comparison, the LEAP protocol requires a minimum
RAM of 600 bytes when it has 1 neighbour and an additional
34 bytes for each additional neighbour.
We have also implemented the MASY protocol on the more
powerful SunSPOT sensor node platform running the Squawk
virtual machine. The SunSPOT has 512kB RAM and 4mB
flash memory. We chose to also implement to protocol on this
platform to show the platform independence of the protocol.
The SunSPOT suite has a size of 68528 bytes. This is
quite a bit larger as the Contiki implementation. The actual
protocol implementation overhead is estimated at about 7kB.
The runtime overhead is estimated 10kB. Both the protocol
implementation and runtime overhead are significantly larger
compared to the Contiki implementation. The reason for this
is (1) the inherent larger byte code and runtime overhead of
Java applications, (2) the more object oriented implementation
of the protocol and (3) when using any cryptography on the
SunSPOT, all the cryptography libraries are included into the
suite, many of which unnecessary. Further optimization could
significantly lower the cost of this protocol on SunSPOT.
The relay functionality is currently not implemented on
either platform. We made a gateway for each platform in Java.
Two separate gateways are needed since currently the Contiki
network layer is incompatible with the SunSPOT network
layer. A single company back-end is implemented in Java for
both applications. The choice for Java was made because it
allows for rapid prototyping.
Two types of messages are transmitted through the sensor
networks: hello messages and reply messages.
The hello message contains the node identification (8 bytes),
the node home IPv4 address (4 bytes) a random nonce (4
bytes) and the signature (16 bytes). The signature is the mes-
sage encrypted with the company key using AES encryptions
with a key size of 16 bytes. This gives a total message size of
32 bytes, which is small and acceptable. The node that relays
the message may need to add additional headers for encryption
and the address of the gateway, but this is limited to another
few bytes.
The reply message contains the node identification (8 bytes)
and the encrypted group key (16 bytes). This gives a total
message size of 24 bytes, again small.
The PAKA protocol uses a message from node to gateway
which is 96 bits (12 bytes) large. The reply message is 64 bits
(8 bytes) large. However it uses a smaller node identification (4
bytes) and smaller keys (8 bytes vs our 16 bytes). The TACK
protocol on the other hand has a request size of 256 bytes and
a reply size of 56 bytes. We note however that TACK uses
asymmetric elliptic curve cryptography.
The computational cost of the protocol is low. Very little
key management computations are done on the sensor node.
The only significant computational work to be done on the
sensor node for this protocol is one encryption operation when
creating a hello message and one decryption operation when
receiving the reply message.
We have not done measurements on network delay or total
network overhead. The network delay depends on many factors
such as number of nodes, speed of nodes, link quality, distance
to gateway, etc. The protocol does not put limits on the delay,
the reply just needs to reach the node. A timer on the new
node could be needed however to ensure that even if the hello
message is lost, a new message is sent.
To conclude, MASY has a limited communications over-
head of a few dozen bytes. The MASY implementation
overhead is limited in the order of a few hundred bytes,
used mostly as memory space for keys, message buffers and
communication buffers. Also, the AES implementation is not
optimized for use in WSNs. Further optimization of the code
of MASY and cryptography protocols can reduce the memory
overhead. The computational overhead of MASY is limited
since the cost of MASY is only one symmetrical encryption
and one symmetrical decryption operation.
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
A. Future Work
Currently we envision three options for further work: (1)
optimizing message overhead for clusters of nodes travelling
together, (2) a re-keying mechanism and (3) extending the
mechanism to deploy asymmetric certificates.
The first extension to MASY is the optimization of the
protocol when nodes travel in clusters instead of alone. It is
likely that a container is outfitted with multiple sensors that
all want to be connected with the network, or that several
containers of the same company travel together. In this case
only one message should be sent for the group of sensor nodes.
A single node, the group leader, is responsible for detecting
when a new network is present. It then sends out the hello
message and waits for the reply. When the reply is received,
the group leader distributes the key over the sensor nodes.
The second extension is to provide a secure re-keying
mechanism while excluding certain nodes. If a key has been
compromised, it should be possible to restore the situation.
Since the key is compromised, the new key cannot be dis-
tributed with the old key. However, by restarting MASY
for each node (or cluster), each non-compromised node can
receive the new group key in a secure fashion. This allows a
compromised network to be restored to a secure state while
excluding the compromising nodes/companies.
The third extension is to deploy certificates instead of sym-
metric keys. Assuming sensor nodes grow more powerful and
new encryption techniques become available, it will become
possible for sensor nodes to perform asymmetric encryption.
In order to set up secure communications, the gateway must
be able to deploy its certificate onto the sensor nodes. A PKI
infrastructure could be used, where the sensor nodes can verify
the certificate of the gateway. However, to limit the key store
on the sensor nodes and remove the need to send and verify
certificate chains, a system similar to MASY could be created,
where instead of having a certificate signed by one of many
possible CA’s, the gateway could ask the owning company
to provide it with a certificate signed by the company. This
way the sensor nodes would only need the company certificate
pre-installed, and only need to verify the company signature,
reducing energy and network use.
B. Conclusion
It is clear that in order for Wireless Sensor Networks
to outgrow their current static use cases, new management
and security mechanisms have to be designed. Accepting
that sensor networks are not static nor owned by a single
company but are mobile and federated environments poses
some interesting new challenges on top of the traditional
problems of scalability and resource limitations.
At this time little research has been performed to securely
deploy keys in Mobile Federated Wireless Sensor Networks.
Most key agreement protocols assume a number of preloaded
secrets which is not feasible in a mobile and federated en-
vironment. In the research of vehicle area network security
some solutions have been proposed, yet these solutions are too
resource intensive to be instantiated on top of sensor nodes.
In this paper we presented a novel symmetrical key de-
ployment protocol for MAnagement of Secret keYs (MASY)
which allows sensor nodes to receive a symmetric key from
a previously unknown gateway. MASY employs the available
back-end infrastructure to set up a trust relationship between
the gateway and the company that owns the sensor nodes. This
trust relation is used to securely deploy the symmetric key to
the sensor nodes. The key can then be used to secure the
communication of the sensor node with the gateway, a group
key to secure all network traffic, or a master key to generate
further keys, depending on the needs of the application.
We implemented MASY on top of the resource constrained
Tmote Sky sensor nodes and the resource rich SunSPOT
nodes. The MASY implementations show that new key mate-
rial can be securely deployed to the sensor nodes with a very
limited code size and message overhead.
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